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Abstract
This paper examines the possible impact of venture capital (VC) backing on the commercialization direction
of technology-based start-ups by asking: To what extent (if at all) do VC-funded start-ups engage in
cooperative commercialization strategies (strategic alliances or technology licensing, or both) relative to a
comparable set of start-ups, and with what consequences? To address these questions, I assemble a novel data
set that matches firms receiving a federal research and development subsidy through the U.S. Small Business
Innovative Research program to VC-funded firms by observable characteristics in five technology-intensive
industries. These data allow decoupling of cooperative activity resulting from start-up development via the
passage of calendar time from that due to association with VCs. An analysis of the 696 start-ups in the sample
(split by an external funding source) suggests substantial boosts in both cooperative activity associated with
VC-backed firms and in the likelihood of an initial public offering.
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VENTURE CAPITALISTS AND COOPERATIVE START-UP 
COMMERCIALIZATION STRATEGY 
 
DAVID H. HSU 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
2000 Steinberg Hall – Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the possible impact of venture capital (VC) backing on the 
commercialization direction of technology-based start-ups by asking: to what extent (if at all) do 
VC-backed start-ups engage in cooperative commercialization strategies (strategic alliances 
and/or technology licensing) relative to a comparable set of start-ups, and with what 
consequences? To address these questions, I assemble a novel dataset that matches firms 
receiving a federal research and development subsidy through the Small Business Innovative 
Research program to VC-backed firms by observable characteristics in five technology-intensive 
industries. This method helps decouple cooperative activity resulting from start-up development 
associated with the passage of calendar time from that due to association with VCs. An analysis 
of the 701 start-ups in the sample (split by external funding source) suggests substantial boosts in 
cooperative activity associated with VC-backed firms, as well as a number of start-up 
performance implications.  
By now the strategic and organizational benefits of inter-firm collaboration—extending 
reach to complementary assets, conserving resources, obtaining new competencies/learning—
have been well-documented across a number of locations and industries (e.g., Gulati, 1998; 
Stuart, 2000). These benefits are balanced against expected costs arising from transaction, 
governance, or other organizational costs (e.g., managerial complacency) when organizations 
consider the decision to self-commercialize or seek collaborative commercialization, leading to 
observed variation in commercialization strategy (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Cooperative commercialization strategies may be particularly important for start-ups 
since entrepreneurial ability to expand the boundaries of their firm through backward or forward 
integration may be limited due to binding resources constraints. For start-ups, the hurdles to 
inter-firm collaboration may be accentuated for four reasons: (1) start-ups face high search costs 
in locating appropriate cooperation partners, (2) start-ups may not want to engage in cooperative 
activity because they fear expropriation, (3) start-ups are of unknown quality, and so would-be 
cooperative partners have difficulty evaluating them, and (4) start-ups are not sufficiently 
developed to engage in cooperative relationships. Each of these potential obstacles is discussed, 
together with how VCs may mitigate these them in enabling cooperative start-up strategies. 
A first impediment to start-up cooperative behavior is simply that they face higher search 
costs for potential cooperation partner matching. This can result from start-ups’ reluctance in 
broadcasting their product or service development, especially in settings in which ventures are 
privately-held and entrepreneurs fear alerting potential competitors of their strategic direction. 
While researchers have highlighted the role of prior alliance networks as a source of information 
about firms’ existence, capabilities, and needs that can lead firms to enter new alliances (e.g., 
Kogut, Shan, and Walker, 1994), de-novo start-ups may not have access to this channel relative 
to more established firms. VC information intermediation may help start-ups get matched with 
cooperation partners due to their intensive due diligence and monitoring processes, together with 
their knowledge of the needs and capabilities of other firms.  
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A second obstacle to start-up cooperation may be entrepreneurial fear of expropriation 
when negotiating with potential cooperation partners. Start-up idea disclosure is a necessary part 
of cooperation contracting, and the threat of entrepreneurial idea expropriation can affect both 
ex-ante start-up innovation incentives and start-up commercialization strategy (Gans, Hsu and 
Stern, 2002). Start-up involvement in a VC portfolio can mitigate appropriation concerns by 
increasing the cost to cooperation partner defection. By broadening the network in which the 
start-up is engaged (to incorporate the VC’s network of contacts), defecting cooperation partners 
will face a larger potential penalty, since perverse behavior will be broadcast faster and more 
pervasively through the network (Coleman, 1988; Robinson and Stuart, 2003).  
A third potential obstacle to start-up collaborative commercialization is that start-ups may 
be of unknown quality to potential cooperation partners. The literature in this area observes that 
endorsements or certifications of reputable parties can signal to relatively uninformed outsiders 
the quality of the unknown start-up (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 
1999). Endorsements from known affiliates (such as VCs) may be particularly important for 
start-ups without established reputations or for start-ups with particularly uncertain technology. 
A final potential stumbling block to start-up cooperation may be that these firms are not 
yet sufficiently developed to be attractive to potential cooperation partners. Recent literature on 
the business development role of VCs has emphasized, for example, their ability to 
professionalize employment practices (Hellmann and Puri, 2002) at start-ups. Taken as a whole, 
the foregoing discussion on how VCs may help facilitate start-up cooperation suggests a first set 
of empirical predictions in this study:  
• Hypothesis 1: VC funding is associated with boosts in start-up cooperative behavior.  
• Hypothesis 2: VCs differ in reputation, and start-ups affiliated with higher reputation 
VCs forge more cooperative outcomes.  
The prior literature also suggests a number of predictions regarding organizational performance 
following cooperative behavior and as a result of VC funding. A first group of studies examined 
the association between network ties and innovative output (patents). In the setting of 
biotechnology start-ups, Shan, Walker and Kogut (1994) find that cooperative behavior is linked 
with innovative output. Similarly, Ahuja (2000) that direct and indirect ties in the chemicals 
industry is linked with patent output. 
A number of studies have also examined the link between network ties and initial public 
offerings. Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) find the hazard of IPO increases with the reputation 
of entrepreneurial ventures’ strategic alliance and investment bank affiliates. Stuart (2000) links 
IPO performance to characteristics of the cooperation partner, finding that alliances with larger 
firms confer more value (better performance) to the entrepreneurial venture. Taken together, the 
foregoing discussion suggests a second set of empirical predictions:  
• Hypothesis 3: VC funding is positively associated with the likelihood of a start-up firm 
IPO. 
• Hypothesis 4: VCs differ in reputation, and start-ups backed by more reputable VCs have 
an enhanced probability of achieving an IPO.  
• Hypothesis 5: Of the start-ups that go public, those that have VC backing have a more 
reputable IPO underwriter. 
  
METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND VARIABLES 
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The empirical strategy is depicted schematically in Figure 1. The distance y is the post-
funding level of cooperation, the distance x is the pre-funding level of cooperation. Testing the 
first two hypotheses involves estimating y = f (VC, x, z), where VC is an indicator variable for 
VC-backed start-ups, and z is a set of control variables. Since y is a non-negative count variable, 
I use negative binomial regressions for estimating these equations. 
     --------------------------  
Figure 1 about here 
     -------------------------- 
Testing the performance hypotheses involve estimating both the likelihood that a firm undergoes 
an IPO and the level of IPO underwriter reputation, using in both cases the same set of right hand 
side variables as before. Probit and Cox hazard models are used to estimate the IPO equations, 
and OLS regressions are used to estimate the IPO underwriter reputation models. Before 
describing the data set and variables, it will be useful to examine some institutional details of the 
two external financing mechanisms, SBIR and VC, used in the study to understand the 
comparability of matched start-ups based on different external funding sources.  
The SBIR program is administered through the U.S. Small Business Administration 
(SBA), and American-owned, independent firms with 500 or fewer employees are eligible. 
Award winners are selected based on “small business qualification, degree of innovation, 
technical merit, and future market potential” (SBA web site). Proposals are peer-reviewed for 
technical and commercial merit, and funds are awarded competitively. Unlike VC financing, the 
government through the SBIR program does not take an equity stake in exchange for the grant. 
Moreover, the program is the largest of its kind, having awarded $1.5B in 2001, up from its first 
year of operation in 1983, during which it awarded $45M (SBA website). 
SBIR funding takes place in two stages, with phase I earmarked for proof of concept and 
idea development and phase II awards reserved for technology development and exploring 
commercial potential. Phase I awards were capped at $100,000 during the sample period (ending 
in 1999), while phase II awards during the sample period were capped at $750,000. Only those 
firms with a phase I award are considered for a phase II award. For the period 1991-93, for all 11 
participating federal agencies, the average ratio of funded phase I proposals to proposals received 
was 13.3% (USGAO, 1995). The competitiveness for phase II awards was much more intense, at 
about 5%. For more details of the SBIR program, see Lerner (1999). 
VCs select the firms they wish to fund by reviewing business plans, which consider both 
the technical and commercial merits of an idea. VCs tend to concentrate their investments in a 
much narrower range of technical projects—particularly in the communications, information 
technology, and biotechnology sectors—relative to the SBIR program. To address this issue, 
sampled SBIR projects are restricted to encompass only those in which VCs concentrate their 
investments (in five high technology sectors).  
Despite these differences in selecting projects between the two financing mechanisms, 
there are many similarities in the inputs to- and characteristics of- the SBIR and VC financed 
projects. First, both forms of funding are highly selective. Second, the levels of funding for 
successful VC and SBIR recipients have not been that different historically (Lerner, 1999), 
though this has clearly changed since the mid-1990s. Because successful SBIR recipients 
typically receive multiple phase II awards for technology development, the average project may 
have received comparable levels of outside funding. Third, the age of organizations at the time 
that they received external financing (VC or SBIR) is comparable (Lerner, 1999). In sum, while 
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SBIR and VC represent different funding sources, controlled comparisons of projects funded by 
each will help us isolate the effect of VC association on start-up commercialization strategy.   
A list of phase II SBIR funded firms from 1988 through 1999 was generously provided to 
me by the SBA. Restricting the sample to phase II SBIR recipients was meant to establish some 
uniformity in the overall sample regarding promising technologies (relative to venture-backed 
ones). This list of SBIR awardees was further restricted to those operating in one of five SIC 
industries: biotechnology (SIC 2836), industrial machinery & equipment (SIC 35), electronic & 
electrical equipment (SIC 36), scientific instruments (SIC 38), and pre-packaged computer 
software (SIC 7372). From this list of phase II awardees, I sampled every fifth SBIR-backed 
company. This effort led to identification of 661 SBIR-backed firms. I then tried to identify a 
venture-backed match for each of the firms by using the following hierarchical procedure: the 
SIC industry had to match, the year of funding had to match, the year of founding had to match, 
and the geographic location (at the state level) had to match. If no match was found using all four 
criteria, the geographic location constraint was dropped. If no match was found using the 
remaining three criteria, the year of founding criteria was dropped, etc., though the SIC industry 
match was always retained (no match was declared if the SIC industry criterion was not 
satisfied). I eliminated those venture-backed start-ups that had received SBIR funding. This 
process yielded identification of 454 VC-backed firms. 
To find cooperation data, I relied on the SDC Platinum Alliances database to obtain 
strategic alliance and licensing data. I gathered counts of cooperation events using the year in 
which the firm received external funding (SBIR or VC) as the dividing line between pre- and 
post-cooperation events. Unfortunately, 53.6% of the SBIR-backed firms were not included in 
the SDC database, as compared to 13.2% of the VC-backed firms. Since these measures of post-
funding cooperation are the dependent variables in the analyses, this reduced the usable number 
of observations to a total of 701.1  
Additional databases are used to compile further information about these firms: Venture 
Economics is consulted for financing amounts and experience of VCs; SDC Platinum’s Public 
Offerings database provides IPO data; Corptech Directory provides industry, location, sales and 
employee information (including historic information); and the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office provides patent data.2 The following paragraphs describe the data used in the empirical 
analyses.  
The dependent variables in the analyses are measures of cooperation and start-up 
performance. Cooperation is measured through count variables. Post-funding R&D alliances is 
the number of R&D alliances following the introduction of external funding (mean = 1.6 for the 
overall sample). There are significant differences between VC and SBIR sub-sample post-
funding R&D alliances (mean = 1.95 vs. 0.63, respectively) in this univariate comparison. A 
similar variable measures alliance and technology license counts. A second set of dependent 
variables examines performance consequences. IPO is a dummy variable = 1 if an initial public 
offering was achieved as of January 2002 (VC and SBIR means = 0.44 and 0.18, respectively). 
IB reputation is a measure of investment bank underwriter reputation taken from Carter, Dark 
and Singh (1998). The variable ranges from a low of zero to a high of nine, and is based on 
underwriter placement in tombstone announcements. The IB reputation means for the VC and 
SBIR sub-samples are = 7.08 and 4.01, respectively. 
The independent variables in the analyses span a range of start-up characteristics. The 
key independent variable is ever VC-backed. This measure takes the value of 1 if the start-up 
received venture capital funding as of January 2002, and the data are from the Venture 
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Economics database. Nearly three quarters of the entire sample received VC funding, with about 
40% of the SBIR sub-sample receiving subsequent VC funding. As a measure of VC reputation, 
high VC IPO record is a dummy = 1 if the VC’s prior IPO record up to the time of funding the 
target start-up placed it in the upper half of the sample (the threshold value is 21 IPOs, and mean 
= 0.47). This variable, of course, can only be constructed for the sub-sample that was VC funded. 
A second set of independent variables control for pre-funding cooperative activity, either in pre-
funding R&D alliances (mean = 0.93) or in aggregate alliance and licensing pre-funding 
cooperative events (mean = 1.98). A third set of control variables are defined for start-up year 
founded (mean = June 1981), year funded (mean = June 1993), the net present value of aggregate 
external monetary inflows as of 1999, as well as pre-funding levels of sales, employees, and 
patents. A final set of control variables capture location and industry effects: dummy variables 
are defined for Massachusetts-located (mean = 0.16) and California-located (mean = 0.32). The 
industry controls include biotechnology (15% of the sample), software (25% of the sample), 
electronic equipment (24%), industrial equipment (12%), and scientific/medical equipment 
(24%).  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In R&D alliance negative binomial regressions, where the dependent variable is a count 
of start-up post-funding R&D alliances, the estimated VC funding coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 1-5% levels, depending on the specification. These results control for a number 
of start-up characteristics: pre-funding R&D alliances, year founded, year funded, total dollar 
inflows, high employees, high sales, pre-funding patents, Massachusetts located start-up, 
California located start-up, and a set of industry controls for biotechnology, software, electrical 
equipment, and scientific instruments (industrial equipment is the excluded category). The 
estimated ever received VC funding coefficient in the fully specified model is economically 
significant, with an implied 1.68 incidence ratio. 
Neither varying the definition of VC funding to demarcate initial external funding source, 
nor dropping the observations that correspond to start-ups that received VC funding after 
receiving SBIR funding initially, qualitatively alter the results.3 The sample was also restricted as 
a robustness check to start-ups founded before the early- to mid-1990s, when VC funding 
skyrocketed, to establish further comparability between the sub-samples. This did not change the 
results. Varying the definition of cooperation to number of post-funding sales and marketing 
alliances or the number of technology licenses does not substantively change the results. 
Furthermore, the results hold when zero-inflated negative binomial regressions are employed.  
A second set of empirical results confirm the IPO predictions. In probits of the likelihood 
of achieved IPO by January 2002 using the same set of regressors as before, the ever received 
VC funding estimate is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimated 
coefficients imply that a discrete change from being not VC-backed to ever having received VC 
funding is associated with a 19-25% boost in the likelihood of an IPO, depending on the 
specification. The same results are achieved using a Cox hazard regression on yearly data to 
more precisely capture the timing of events and to more properly deal with the right censoring of 
the data. In these analyses, the clock starts when the start-up is founded, and failure occurs when 
the start-up undergoes an IPO.  
To explore the differential effect of more reputable VCs, I examine the sub-sample of 
firms that received VC-backing, and look for heterogeneous start-up value associated with more 
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reputable VCs. The variable of interest is high VC IPO record. Estimated implied incidence rate 
ratios on high VC IPO record are 1.71 and 1.60, respectively, and the estimates are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. VC reputation also appears to matter in the case of IPOs for the 
current start-up venture. A probit of IPO as of January 2002 using the fully specified model 
suggests that having a high reputation VC is associated with a 15% boost in the likelihood of an 
IPO (evaluated at the mean of the other independent variables), a result that is significant at the 
1% level. This result holds in a hazard model using a similar specification.  
Finally, OLS regressions of investment banker reputation for the sample of start-ups that 
realized an IPO indicate that ever received VC funding is positive and significantly related to 
investment bank reputation at the 1% level. The measure of investment banker reputation is the 
0-9 scale developed by Carter, Dark and Singh (1998).  
In conclusion, this paper examined the possible impact of venture capital (VC) backing 
on the commercialization direction of technology-based start-ups by asking: to what extent (if at 
all) do VC-backed start-ups engage in cooperative commercialization strategies (strategic 
alliances and/or technology licensing), and with what consequences? An analysis of the resulting 
701 start-ups (split by external funding source) suggests substantial boosts in VC-backed 
cooperative activity, as well as several start-up performance implications.  
 
References Available from the Author 
 
 
Figure 1. Empirical Strategy Conceptualization 
 
                                                 
1 Perhaps it is not surprising that SDC would carry much better coverage for VC-backed firms, since these firms are 
more visible. The disparity in the coverage, however, does raise questions of comparability of the sub-samples in the 
study, especially relative to the original matching procedure. Collecting and controlling for other firm-level 
variables, however, should mitigate concerns about other factors that might affect observed variation in cooperation. 
2 To address the issue of bias as a result of missing observations of the dependent variable previously discussed, I 
performed t-tests of equal means of key independent variables within the funding source sub-samples and found 
that, consistent with expectations, smaller firms as measured by employees and sales tended to be missing more 
often from the database. 
3 Approximately 40% of the SBIR firms subsequently received venture funding. The empirical results are largely 
robust to: (1) treating these SBIR firms as part of the SBIR pool, (2) treating these firms as part of the VC pool, and 
(3) dropping them from the analysis. In some instances, the specifications were not robust to industry sector 
controls. 
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